Couriers, Not Kingpins: Toward a More Just Federal Sentencing Regime for Defendants Who Deliver Drugs by Lerman, Kevin E
UC Irvine Law Review
Volume 7
Issue 3 Baby Markets Article 8
12-2017
Couriers, Not Kingpins: Toward a More Just
Federal Sentencing Regime for Defendants Who
Deliver Drugs
Kevin E. Lerman
UC Irvine School of Law, klerman@lawnet.uci.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by
an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Kevin E. Lerman, Couriers, Not Kingpins: Toward a More Just Federal Sentencing Regime for Defendants Who Deliver Drugs, 7 U.C. Irvine
L. Rev. 679 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol7/iss3/8
Final to Printer_Lerman (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2018 8:48 AM 
 
679 
Couriers, Not Kingpins: Toward a More 
Just Federal Sentencing Regime for 
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Editors’ Note: The following Note discusses proposed changes to federal 
sentencing guidelines. Additions to the guidelines are noted in bolded text and 
deletions are noted by the use of the strikethrough function. 
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Thirty years ago, the Federal Sentencing Commission produced guidelines for 
drug-trafficking offenses, which calculated mandatory sentences based on the 
quantity of drugs a defendant could be held responsible for trafficking.1 The original 
plan for the drug guidelines was to set the prescribed sentencing range according to 
some sort of average based on actual sentences given for similar sets of facts.2 But 
while the original sentencing commission developed the first set of guidelines, 
Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which imposed severe 
mandatory minimum penalties for drug-trafficking offenses.3 For the Guidelines to 
track the newly established mandatory minimums, the Commission (consistent with 
1980s war-on-drugs hysteria)4 “incorporated [mandatory minimums] into the 
 
1. This was a result of the 1987 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which were promulgated following 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (1987). 
2. The Commission had collected data from a set of 10,500 federal cases. KATE STITH &  
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 59 
(1998). 
3. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). While this act came to highly determinative conclusions 
about drug offenders’ profiles, it was passed without the benefit of any hearings or reports related to 
the act. See Patti B. Saris, A Generational Shift for Federal Drug Sentences, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 n.8 
(2015) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 5–6 (2002)). 
4. See, e.g., Dave Zirin, The Death of Len Bias, My Generation’s One-Person Shock Doctrine, THE 
NATION: DRUG WAR AND DRUG POLICY (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/
Death-Len-Bias-My-Generations-One-Person-Shock-Doctrine/ [http://perma.cc/WJW2-9787] 
(discussing the widely-held belief that mandatory minimums were triggered by Bias’s overdose). 
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Guidelines at their inception.”5 The Commission relied on the assumption that a 
drug defendant’s culpability was meaningfully linked to the amount of drugs she 
was found responsible for.6 Certain quantities were presumptively indicative of 
kingpin status, and therefore, presumptively warranted kingpin-length sentences.7 
Further, the first sentencing table was actually set above the mandatory minimum 
to enable prosecutors to leverage sentencing reductions in exchange for defendants’ 
guilty pleas (to get credit for accepting responsibility)8 and cooperation.9 Thus, the 
severity of drug sentences came both from the assumed link between quantity and 
elevated status and from the goal of providing additional time for prosecutors to 
bargain with to get defendants to quickly plead guilty. 
While the sentencing table was pegged to high-level kingpins, kingpins have 
largely failed to show up for the full incarceration10 feast.11 Instead, since the 
Guidelines went into effect, federal prisons have been increasingly populated with 
 
5. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 60; Saris, supra note 3, at 5 n.24. The Commission failed 
to rely on past sentencing practices in any systematic way. While there was a plan to linking sentencing 
to the survey of past sentencing data, sentences were elevated for many offenses including drug 
offenses. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 60–61; see also id. at 68–69. 
6. Notably, whether the offense involves a drug conspiracy, money taken in a bank robbery, or 
a number of unauthorized immigrants in an unlawful immigration scheme, the “most common specific 
offense characteristic found in the Sentencing Guidelines is quantity.” STITH & CABRANES, supra note 
2, at 68–69. Yet, the Commission has neither stated nor explained “why these quantifiable 
differences . . . are appropriate measures of the extent of individual culpability, or why they are more 
significant than other sentencing factors that receive less weight in Guidelines sentencing calculations.” 
Id. at 69. 
 7. Commentators have noted: 
   The apparent intent of the [mandatory minimum legislation] was to increase sentences 
on major drug offenders. As Senator Robert Byrd stated: [¶] [A major drug offender] must 
know that there will be no escape hatch through which he can avoid a term of years in the 
penitentiary. . . . We divide these major drug dealers into two groups for purposes of fixing 
what their required jail terms shall be: For the kingpins—the masterminds who are really 
running these operations—and they can be identified by the amount of drugs with which 
they are involved—we require a jail term upon conviction. If it is their first conviction,  
the minimum is 10 years. . . . Our proposal would also provide mandatory minimum 
penalties for the middle-level dealers as well. Those criminals would also have to serve time 
in jail . . . a minimum of 5 years for the first offense. 
Barbara Meierhoefer, The Severity of Drug Sentences: A Result of Purpose or Chance?, 12 FED. SENTENCING 
REP. 34, 34 (1999) (quoting 132 CONG. REC. § 14301 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of  
Sen. Byrd)). 
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) 
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. 
9. Saris, supra note 3, at 6; U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 5K1.1. 
10. See, e.g., Jailhouse Nation: How to Make America’s Penal System Less Punitive and More 
Effective, THE ECONOMIST ( June 20, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21654619-
how-make-americas-penal-system-less-punitive-and-more-effective-jailhouse-nation [https:// 
perma.cc/HYQ7-QZAN]. 
11. The Commission estimates the most culpable drug traffickers, including high-level suppliers 
and importers, and managers and supervisors account for only 10.9% and 1.1% of drug cases, 
respectively. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
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kingpins’ underlings: couriers,12 mules,13 street-level dealers, and others.14 This Note 
presents modest proposals to roll back extremely harsh and inconsistent sentencing 
practices that remain in effect for drug enterprise underlings. 
In many ways, Congress and the Commission were wrong to assume that 
quantity would be a reliable indicator of culpability. In the years since, the 
Commission has suggested, “[M]andatory minimum penalties for drug offenses 
may apply more broadly than Congress may have originally intended.”15 The Attorney 
General’s office reflected this sentiment through its nationwide policy shift away 
from alleging mandatory minimum triggering drug quantities against low-level drug-
trafficking defendants.16 But since the quantity-based guidelines are still pegged  
to the mandatory minimums, the Guidelines fail where drug-quantity-based 
calculations impose kingpin culpability levels on couriers and mules. 
The Guidelines and drug-trafficking statutes have left courts, prosecutors, and 
probation officers ill equipped to deal with some of the most commonly seen drug 
trafficking defendants, namely, those who are recruited—and often exploited—to 
handle the riskiest part of the enterprise: the transportation. 
This Note proposes significant fixes to one of the largest “classes” of federal 
defendants, drug couriers and drug mules.17 This class has suffered a large 
proportion of the impact of federal quantity-based guidelines and mandatory 
minimum sentences. Drug couriers and drug mules who carry drugs in their vehicles 
or on or in their person make up a substantial portion of federal drug offenders.18 
 
12. The Commission defines a courier as a person who “[t]ransports or carries drugs using a 
vehicle or other equipment.” Id. 
13. A mule is defined as a person who “[t]ransports or carries drugs internally or on his or her 
person.” Id. 
14. A street-level dealer is one who “[d]istributes retail quantities (less than one ounce) directly 
to users.” Id. While this Note focuses on mules and couriers, other low-level players, such as  
street-level dealers and brokers, are included in the ranks of vulnerable drug-trafficking actors  
facing treacherous sentencing exposure. See also Human Rights Watch, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How 
U.S. Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty (2013), https://www.HRW.org/report/
2013/12/05/Offer-You-Cant-Refuse/How-US-Federal-Prosecutors-Force-Drug-Defendants-Plead 
[https://perma.cc/C589-CWTC]. Notably, the Mandatory Minimum Report indicates that “[a]mong 
those offenders who received relief from the mandatory minimum penalty by providing substantial 
assistance to the government, the Commission’s analysis shows that offenders who performed high-
level functions generally obtained relief for substantial assistance at higher rates than offenders who 
performed low-level functions.” MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 171. 
15. MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 169 (emphasis added). 
16. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Eric Holder to the U.S. Attorneys and Assistant Attorney 
General for the Criminal Division, (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/
legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-
recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS6H-9AR8]. 
17. More than half of drug defendants (fifty-three percent) were placed in Criminal History 
Category I, signifying that they had minor or no criminal history. “And only 6% of drug-trafficking 
defendants could be classified as managers or leaders, i.e. individuals occupying the highest rungs  
of a drug enterprise.” United States v. Leitch, No. 11-CR-00609 ( JG), 2013 WL 753445, at *11 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) (Gleeson, J.). 
18. The Commission estimates couriers alone account for twenty-three percent of drug-
trafficking cases. MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 167–68, fig. 8–9. 
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But according to the Commission’s own research and given reputable attacks on 
the drug war, couriers and mules should not fill federal prisons. Not only is it critical 
to right the wrongs of quantity-based guidelines to remedy unjust and disparate 
sentences, but it will also help alleviate woeful overcrowding in federal prison, while 
also saving scarce resources.19 
Section I of this Note lays the groundwork for analyzing courier and mule 
sentencing by describing relevant sentencing guidelines and illustrating what is at 
stake for low-level drug-trafficking defendants if they do not receive reductions for 
minor or minimal role. Section II illustrates the unsuccessful attempts to achieve 
working guidelines for couriers and mules. Quantity-based sentencing was based on 
mistaken Congressional assumptions that lengthy sentences would reach high-level 
drug traffickers. Commission research places couriers and mules at the lowest levels 
of drug-trafficking hierarchies. Yet, the Mitigating Role Guideline,20 despite 
repeated tinkering, lends itself to inconsistent interpretations and ideological 
shaping that is out of sync with Congress’s intent and empirical research. Section II 
describes the 2015 Amendment and argues that the application will remain troubled. 
Section III outlines alternative considerations for future amendments that will 
target low-level couriers and mules. These include analyzing jurisdictional obstacles, 
examining application disparity between geographic regions, discussing the failure 
of appellate decisions to keep pace with guideline amendments, and critiquing 
assumptions by all actors involved in sentencing drug defendants, including courts, 
probation officers, and defense attorneys. 
Finally, Section IV proposes several solutions to the inconsistent, overly severe 
regime described in Sections I–III. First, Role Cap, Section 2D1.1(a)(5),21 should be 
extended to average participants in addition to minor and minimal participants. This 
will lessen the impact for low-level defendants on the cusp of receiving mitigating 
role adjustments. Second, and similarly, Section 2D1.1(b)(5)’s22 increase for 
methamphetamine should only apply to defendants receiving aggravating role 
adjustments. Third, the Mitigating Role Guideline, Section 3B1.2,23 should be 
amended to contain a functional role analysis. This will encourage more consistent 
application of the guideline and will permit meaningful appellate review for role 
denials. Fourth, the Mitigating Role Guideline and the Aberrant Behavior 
Guideline24 should be amended to disentangle the two. This will prevent judges 
from conflating aberrancy and role factors. The two analyses should be expressly 
separated by probation officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and sentencing 
courts. Finally, the Mitigating Role Guideline should be amended with unequivocal 
 
19. According to the Bureau of Prisons, the average yearly cost per inmate in 2014 was 
$30,619.85. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Annual Determination of Average Cost of 
Incarceration, 80 Fed. Reg. 12321, 12523 (Mar. 9, 2015). 
20. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 3B1.2. 
21. Id. at § 2D1.1(a)(5). 
22. Id. at § 2D1.1(b)(5). 
23. Id. at § 3B1.2. 
24. Id. at § 5K2.20. 
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language to overrule “indispensability” jurisprudence. Case law should no longer 
permit judges to deny mitigating role adjustments on a vague notion of 
indispensability to a drug-trafficking operation. Doing so is arbitrary and conflates 
role analysis with basic causation analysis necessary for every conviction. 
I. GUIDELINES APPLICATION TO 
LOW-LEVEL DRUG-TRAFFICKING DEFENDANTS 
Even though the Guidelines are technically advisory under Booker,25 they 
remain the starting point for sentencing calculations.26 And districts’ practices of 
closely following the Guidelines remain deeply institutionalized.27 
Courts calculate guideline sentences in drug cases by first calculating a 
quantity-based “base offense level” under Section 2D1.1.28 If the quantity-based 
offense level is between thirty-two and thirty-eight, defendants are eligible for an 
additional reduction under Section 2D1.1(a)(5)’s Role-Cap provision as long as the 
court grants a mitigating role reduction (described below). The main text of the 
mitigating role guideline provides: 
Section 3B1.2. Mitigating Role: 
Based on the defendant’s role in the offense, decrease the offense level as 
follows: 
(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, 
decrease by 4 levels. 
(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, 
decrease by 2 levels. In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 
levels.29 
Courts then apply relevant adjustments to arrive at an “adjusted base offense 
level” or “total offense level.” The mitigating role adjustment is critical in courier 
and mule cases because it triggers a cascade effect that greatly decreases the kingpin-
quantity-based guidelines sentencing range. If a defendant can show she is 
“substantially less culpable than the average participant,” then she is eligible for a 
two-, three-, or four-level reduction from the calculated offense level.30 Since the 
burden for seeking an adjustment falls on the party seeking it, the burden falls on 
defendants, making it even more difficult for low-information defendants to prove 
 
25. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
26. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (noting that district courts “should begin 
all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range . . . [a]s a matter of 
administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and 
the initial benchmark”) (citation omitted). 
27. Mona Lynch & Marisa Omori, Legal Change and Sentencing Norms in the Wake of Booker: 
The Impact of Time and Place on Drug Trafficking Cases in Federal Court, 48 LAW & SOC. REV. 411, 
419–21 (2014). “As a result, the underlying federal justice institutions are much more massive and 
entrenched than they were prior to the Guidelines era, making them less pliable.” Id. at 441. 
28. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 2D1.1. 
29. Id. at § 3B1.2. 
30. Id. at § 3B1.2 Comment 3(a). 
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they qualify. If the offense involved the importation of methamphetamine, the 
mitigating role adjustment then deactivates an otherwise applicable two-level increase 
under Section 2D1.1(b)(5).31 
Once an offense level is calculated, courts assign criminal history points by 
calculating a defendant’s criminal history.32 The adjusted base offense level and the 
criminal history category are plotted on a two-dimensional sentencing table with 
offense levels on the vertical axis and the criminal history level on the horizontal 
axis.33 Where the offense level and criminal history intersect, the table lists ranges 
of months, which amount to “guideline sentences.”34 
Table 1 demonstrates the offense-level calculations for two identical cases: one 
in a mitigating-role-granting court, the other in a mitigating-role-denying court. In 
the example, two defendants plead guilty to importing five kilograms of 
methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 960(a)(1) and (b)(1)(H), which results in a 
base offense level of thirty-eight under U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(c).35 With minor 
role, the defendant’s base offense level is reduced by four points under Section 
2D1.1(a)(5)’s role-cap proviso, she receives a two-point minor role adjustment 
under Section 3B1.2, and is not subject to a two-point increase for 
methamphetamine under Section 2D1.1(b)(5). After other common sentencing 
reductions,36 the resulting offense level is twenty-three. In contrast, without a minor 
role reduction, the other defendant does not receive the Role Cap adjustment and 
she is penalized under the Methamphetamine Importation Guideline. There is a net 
difference of eight points between the two. A total offense level of twenty-three 
results in a sentencing range of 46–57 months; a total offense level of thirty-one 
yields a range of 108–135 months. Thus, there is a difference of sixty-two months 
at the low ends and seventy-eight months at the high ends for the exact same 
conduct. This difference relies on whether a courier carries her burden of showing 
she is substantially less culpable than the average participant. This is a very difficult 











32. See id. at ch. 4. 
33. See id. at 420. 
34. Id. 
35. See id. at § 2D1.1(c) (depicting the Drug Quantity Table, which sets offense levels based on 
the quantity of drugs involved in the offense). 
36. See infra notes 37–38. 
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Table 1: Methamphetamine Importation with and Without Role 
Minor Role Adjustment             No Role Adjustment
Base Offense Level (BOL) 
BOL Role-Cap [§ 2D1.1(a)(5)] 





Resulting Offense Level 











Base Offense Level (BOL) 
BOL Role-Cap [§ 2D1.1(a)(5)] 





Resulting Offense Level 












Thus, in this example, a difference of about five years to six-and-a-half years 
hinges on the mitigating role determination. While judges have discretion to depart 
or vary from the guideline range, mitigating role causes their departure or variance 
to begin at a vastly different place, making denial devastating. 
II. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE WORKING MITIGATING ROLE 
AND ROLE CAP GUIDELINES 
In 2014, U.S. Sentencing Commission Chair Hon. Patti B. Saris cited couriers 
and mules—without qualification—as examples of defendants who qualify for 
mitigating-role adjustments.39 The Sentencing Commission’s research has placed 
them at the bottom of the drug-trafficking-organization role-culpability hierarchy.40 
In 2002, the Commission issued a report to the Congress on the structure of 
cocaine-trafficking organizations and the effect of that empirical data on sentencing 
for drug offenses.41 Since then, the Commission has constantly maintained the view 
 
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f ); U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at §§ 2D1.1(b)(17), 2D1.11(b)(6), 5C1.2. 
Section 3553(f )(1)–(5) and Guideline Section 5C1.2 allow some defendants relief from statutory 
minimum sentences if they have a limited criminal history, did not use violence in the offense, did not 
harm anyone in the offense, did not have an aggravated role, and underwent a debrief with the 
government. 
38. Fast Track is an early disposition program used in some jurisdictions with the goal of 
preserving prosecutorial resources in exchange for defendants waiving certain trial rights, accepting 
responsibility, and pleading guilty. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 5K3.1 (“Upon motion of the 
Government, the court may depart downward not more than 4 levels pursuant to an early disposition 
program authorized by the Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney for 
the district in which the court resides.”). 
39. Saris, supra note 3, at 6. 
40. See. e.g., MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 166–67. 
41. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
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that couriers and mules are acting out “less serious functions.”42 In one study, the 
Commission listed couriers and mules as eighth and ninth out of nine categorical 
roles listed in descending order of culpability.43 Similarly, another study placed 
couriers and mules at thirteenth and fourteenth in an eighteen-level hierarchy of 
active participants in drug-distribution conspiracies, which is in the bottom third of 
participants.44 
But across the United States, many judges ignore the empirical data, and 
neither the guidelines, nor the courts of appeal impede them. In the Ninth Circuit, 
which handles some twenty-one percent of the Country’s drug-trafficking cases,45 
and the Fifth Circuit, which handles another eighteen percent,46 mitigating role  
is regularly denied by some judges on facts that qualify for maximum role  
reductions in other parts of the country. For years, couriers and mules had a near-
equal chance of getting charged under mandatory minimums as not.47 This 
difference—in a system seeking to reduce disparity between similar offenders—
was very alarming. While this radical difference in charging and convictions for the 
same functional role may have been lessened by Attorney General Eric Holder’s 
2013 Memorandum,48 getting a defendant “out of the mandatory minimum frying 
 
42. Id. at 36–37. 
43. MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 166–67, 173, fig. 8-12. 
44. COCAINE SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 41, at C-3, tbl. C1. 
45. In Fiscal Year 2013, the Ninth Circuit had over 21% of the countries’ drug trafficking cases. 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 DATAFILE USSCFY13 (Unless otherwise specified, when referring 
to Commission statistics, specific years refer to the “fiscal years.”). In 2014, the Southern District  
of California alone had 1,494 (seven percent) of the country’s 21,323 drug trafficking cases. See  
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2014 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN, 
http://www.USSC.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-
sourcebooks/2014/stats_CAS.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8CZ-FWWT]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
FISCAL YEAR 2014 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, NAT’L DATA, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/stats_Nat.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ZC7S-3CRB]. 
46. In 2013, the Fifth Circuit had over eighteen percent of federal drug trafficking cases.  
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 DATAFILE USSCFY13. 
47. MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 167 (“Only two functions—Courier 
and Mule—were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty in less than half of 
the cases (49.6% and 43.1%, respectively).”). 
48. The Attorney General instructed prosecutors to avoid charging mandatory-minimum-
activating charges against “certain non-violent low-level drug offenders.” Holder, supra note 16, at 1. 
The Attorney General’s 2013 memorandum was issued following the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013), that “[f ]acts that increase the statutory mandatory 
minimum sentence are therefore elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” As such, the Attorney General instructed federal prosecutors not to use charging 
language that would trigger the mandatory minimums for defendants who (1) could not be shown to 
have used violence or committed an offense involving minors or death or serious bodily injury; (2) were 
not organizers, leaders, managers or supervisors; (3) did not have significant ties to drug traffickers; 
and (4) did not have significant criminal history. Holder, supra note 16, at 2. 
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pan” still only gets her “into the Guidelines fire.”49 For couriers and mules, a 
mitigating role adjustment is the only way to avoid getting burned. 
The quantity-based guidelines are problematic for many reasons, and require 
large overhauls.50 Quantity-based guidelines for drug offenses were never linked to 
the heartland of district court sentences.51 Drug-trafficking guideline ranges have 
been criticized for not being based on empirical data, Commission expertise, or the 
actual culpability of defendants.52 As authors Kate Stith and José Cabranes have 
stated, while the Commission started with the goal of basing the guidelines on past 
sentences, it ultimately failed to do so in “any systematic way.”53 Instead, the Guideline 
ranges were pegged to mandatory minimum sentences enacted in 1986, two years 
after the Sentencing Reform Act.54 
In the right political climate, the low-level defendants discussed here will be 
better served by a system that takes them out of the quantity-based paradigm 
altogether.55 So will society be better served if we implement evidence-based 
practices based on empirical data rather than tough-on-crime political stances. For 
now, the subject guidelines require immediate fixes to ensure existing adjustments 
are given more broadly and more consistently. Without intervention, some judges, 
circuit courts, and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, will perpetuate outmoded protocols that 
penalize couriers and mules with kingpin calculations. Circuits continue to affirm 
mitigating role denials even where facts indicate that defendants are situated on the 




49. Memorandum Explaining a Policy Disagreement with the Drug Trafficking Offense 
Guideline at 2, United States v. Diaz, No. 11-CR-00821-2 ( JG), 2013 WL 322243, at *9, *18  
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013) (Gleeson, J.) [hereinafter Diaz Memorandum]. 
50. See, e.g., Smarter Sentencing Act, S. 502, 114th Cong. (2015). The SSA had bipartisan 
support. Among its goals, it aimed to reduce over-criminalization. 
51. Before the passage of the ADAA, the guideline ranges were intended to be based an average 
or heartland of typical sentences. See Saris, supra note 3, at 5 n.24. But the mandatory minimums made 
this virtually impossible, so the empirical data collected for this purpose was discarded, and the 
sentencing table was instead linked to the arbitrarily created mandatory minimums. 
52. Diaz Memorandum, supra note 49, at 2. 
53. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 60 (citation omitted). 
54. See Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 1; Anti-Drug Abuse Act, supra note 3. 
55. See Dan Honold, Quantity, Role, and Culpability in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 389, 405–07 (2014). Hanold argues that functional role analysis should be built 
directly into § 2D1.1(a)(5) so that role is prioritized over quantity-based analysis. He argues that  
[b]ecause quantity improperly aggregates cases, no amount of offense level tweaking will 
lead to just results over the long run of quantity-based sentencing. Role-based sentencing, 
on the other hand, has the potential to achieve just results in many cases, given that the 
offense levels are properly adjusted to reflect societal attitudes towards a given role.  
Id. at 407. Similarly, others have argued for a more limited offense level role cap. See Mark Osler, More 
Than Numbers: A Proposal for Rational Drug Sentences, 19 FED. SENTENCING REP. 326, 326–28 (2007). 
56. See PROBATION OFFICERS ADVISORY GROUP TO THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, Letter to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, at 4 (Mar. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Letter to Saris] 
(discussing the circuit split in the application of mitigating roles). 
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A. The Contours of the Mitigating Role Guideline Remain Unclear to Judges and Many 
Others Even After Years of Tinkering Amendments 
In 2010, the Commission surveyed district court judges on their perception of 
the Mitigating Role Guideline.57 A total of 639 judges responded;58 66% agreed that 
“[t]he distinction between ‘minor’ and ‘minimal’ participant should be explained 
more clearly.”59 Since then, no explanation has been offered, meaning that judges 
are still unclear on the standard. As the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment took 
effect, the U.S. Probation Officers Advisory Group did not understand the purpose 
of the guideline.60 Since judges rely on probation officers to calculate the applicable 
guidelines for cases, the probation officers’ confusion is likely to be reflected by the 
sentencing courts. 
Recent amendments have tried unsuccessfully to clarify the Mitigating Role 
Guideline’s purpose and standard.61 Even with the 2015 Mitigating Role 
Amendment in place, judges still lack guidance as to whether they can compare 
hypothetical participants neither party knows about.62 The cases cited by the 
Commission for the Amendment are not the most recent circuit cases.63 The most 
recent cases appear more permissive of district courts’ engagement in hypothetical 
role analysis.64 Even though federal courts have almost thirty years of experience 
with the Guidelines, Commission amendments still have a tenuous and unclear 
relationship with circuit law. The 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment presents no 
exception, leaving courts of appeal to contemplate the basic effects of the 
amendment on current jurisprudence on the prior version of the guideline. 
B. The Impact of the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment 
On the heels of the Commission’s incremental 2014 “Drugs-Minus-Two” 
Amendment,65 the 2014–2015 amendment cycle produced an amendment to the 
 
57. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2WFT-3VYT]. 
58. Id. at 3. 
59. Id. at 14. 
60. See Letter to Saris, supra note 56, at 3. 
61. See id. 
62. See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief at 14, United States v. Elenes, 591 F. App’x 562 (2015) 
(No. 14-50156) (denying minor role in part because the defendant’s role exceeded that of a hypothetical 
drug-smuggling-compartment welder). 
63. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, supp. to app. C, amend 794, at 117. 
64. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 14, United States v. Elenes, 591 F. App’x 562 (2015)  
(No. 14-50156). 
65. The Drugs-Minus-Two Amendment came about following Commission research showing 
that drug trafficking sentences were overly punitive guidelines. The Amendment gave a slight reduction 
for nearly all levels of drug defendant involvement. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C. Notably, it 
reduces—with exceptions—a broad range of drug trafficking sentences, but had no particularized 
impact on which defendants qualify for a mitigating role reduction. Id. 
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Mitigating Role Guideline’s application notes.66 
As amended, Guideline 3B1.2’s application notes provide in part: 
3. Applicability of Adjustment.— 
(A) Substantially Less Culpable than Average Participant.— This section 
provides a range of adjustments for a defendant who plays a part in 
committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the 
average participant in the criminal activity. 
A defendant who is accountable under §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) only 
for the conduct in which the defendant personally was involved and who 
performs a limited function in the concerted criminal activity is not 
precluded from consideration for may receive an adjustment under this 
guideline. For example, a defendant who is convicted of a drug trafficking 
offense, whose role participation in that offense was limited to 
transporting or storing drugs and who is accountable under §1B1.3 only 
for the quantity of drugs the defendant personally transported or stored is 
not precluded from consideration for may receive an adjustment under 
this guideline. 
. . . 
(B) Conviction of Significantly Less Serious Offense.— If a defendant has 
received a lower offense level by virtue of being convicted of an offense 
significantly less serious than warranted by his actual criminal conduct, a 
reduction for a mitigating role under this section ordinarily is not 
warranted . . . . 
(C) Fact-Based Determination.— The determination whether to apply 
subsection (a) or subsection (b), or an intermediate adjustment, is based 
on the totality of the circumstances and involves a determination that is 
heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case. 
In determining whether to apply subsection (a) or (b), or an 
intermediate adjustment, the court should consider the following 
non-exhaustive list of factors: 
(i) the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and 
structure of the criminal activity; 
(ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in planning or 
organizing the criminal activity; and 
(iii) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the 
criminal activity. 
4. Minimal Participant.— Subsection (a) applies to a defendant described 
in Application Note 3(A) who plays a minimal role in the criminal 
concerted activity. It is intended to cover defendants who are plainly 
among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group. 
Under this provision, the defendant’s lack of knowledge or understanding 
 
66. Id. at amend. 794. 
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of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others 
is indicative of a role as minimal participant. 
5. Minor Participant.— Subsection (b) applies to a defendant described in 
Application Note 3(A) who is less culpable than most other participants in 
the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as minimal. 
6. Application of Role Adjustment in Certain Drug Cases.— In a case in 
which the court applied §2D1.1 and the defendant’s base offense level 
under that guideline was reduced by operation of the maximum base 
offense level in §2D1.1(a)(5), the court also shall apply the appropriate 
adjustment under this guideline.67 
 
While the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment announced desirable policy 
preferences, it failed to address principle concerns of Federal and Community 
Defenders (who spoke on behalf of court-appointed defense attorneys throughout 
the nation)68 and U.S. Probation Officers (whose views are relied on heavily—often 
followed verbatim—by district courts).69 Unfortunately, while the U.S. Probation 
Department and the Department of Justice participate directly in Commission 
operations, the Commission has been deprived of direct participation of critical 
stakeholders, including Federal Defenders.70 This imbalanced structure may have 
played a part in maintaining the Commission’s severe, mandatory sentencing 
structure from the time of the Guidelines’ inception until almost twenty years later 
when the Guidelines were rendered advisory by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Booker.71 Critical to Defenders’ recommendations for the 2015 Amendment was a 
request that an amendment “clearly delineate which functional roles should 
generally be considered mitigating roles.”72 Such delineation would lessen the 
amendment’s susceptibility to vast differences between how different individuals in 
the system interpret the meaning of “average” drug traffickers. It would also follow 
the same structure as aggravating role adjustments, which are based on the 
defendants’ functional roles. 
 
67. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 3B1.2. 
68. See Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to “Mitigating Role,” “Single Sentence 
Rule,” and “Jointly Undertaken Criminal Activity” Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 1 (Mar. 12, 
2015) [hereinafter Mitigating Role Statements] (statement of Jon Sands, Fed. Def. for the Dist. of  
Ariz. on behalf of the Fed. and Community Def.’s). 
69. See Letter to Saris, supra note 56. 
70. Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 1631, 1642–43 (2012) 
(explaining that the Commission operates without the transparency imposed on other government 
agencies, and without any counterweight to ever-present ex-officio Justice Department commentary 
and ex parte communication). Baron-Evans and Stith also argue that “[w]ithout enforceable constraints, 
the Commission failed to take into account the views and evidence presented by the judiciary, the 
defense bar, and others who advised against its proposals,” and that the Commission “promulgated 
amendments materially different from those originally proposed for comment, to which stakeholders 
had no opportunity to respond.” Id. (quotations omitted). 
71. See id. at 1646–48; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
72. Mitigating Role Statements, supra note 68. 
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While the defense bar’s views did not make the final cut of the amendment, 
the U.S. Probation Officers Advisory Group (POAG), with signatories from all 
circuits, was equally unsatisfied with the text of the final amendment. POAG 
indicated the following: 
The purpose of the amendment appeared vague. Is the intent of the amendment 
to expand the analysis of the defendant’s conduct? It is unclear when 
determining if the reduction applies if the analysis should include a 
comparison of similar/typical offenses or the defendant’s role within the 
charged offense. POAG believes limiting the assessment to the defendant’s 
role in the “criminal activity” rather than his/her activity in the typical 
crime, does not rectify the disparity across the country in how the 
mitigating role adjustment is applied, and it may even have the reverse 
effect by creating more ambiguity. POAG believes the application of  
the mitigating role adjustment will continue to be applied inconsistently 
based on the interpretation in each district or circuit. POAG recommends  
the Commission look at case law from the circuits that apply the adjustment 
infrequently to ascertain the barriers that may inhibit application. This may offer 
insight and guide the Commission in developing expanded language or 
formulating examples in the application notes. Much more than a two level 
reduction hinges on minor role. When considering the mitigating role cap 
in USSG §2D1.1, there is a potential swing of seven offense levels73 for 
defendants that are categorically denied mitigating role in one district and 
given the adjustment in another. POAG agrees §3B1.2 needs to be revised 
because it is one of the most inconsistently applied sections across the 
country.74 
Since judges rely heavily on probation officers to calculate applicable 
guidelines for a case, probation officers’ opinions are a bellwether of judicial 
understanding.75 Probation officers are a powerful force in the sentencing process. 
Their presentence reports serve as a starting point for offense-level calculation and 
largely define the “playing field” for formal sentencing discussions.76 At sentencing, 
some judges go so far as to read directly from probation officers’ undisclosed 
sentencing recommendations.77 Critically, if probation officers are confused by the 
guideline, it is likely that confusion will percolate up to the judges who rely on 
probation officers’ reports. 
 
73. The potential swing can be even greater than when minimal role adjustments stand to reduce 
a base offense level from up to thirty-eight to thirty-two under §§ 2D1.1(a)(5) and/or 2D1.1(b)(5) is 
“deactivated” by mitigating role for a methamphetamine offense that would otherwise trigger § 
2D1.1(b)(5). 
74. See Letter to Saris, supra note 56, at 3–4 (emphasis added). 
75. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 70, at 1638 n.29, 1692. 
76. At the 2015 Annual Sentencing Commission training, Commission Vice Chair Judge Charles 
Breyer asked during a plenary session for the hundreds of probation officers and judges to raise their 
hands if they have ex parte presentence meetings, and well over half of the room raised their hands. 
(Observed by the author). 
77. Id. 
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Other advocates and stakeholders downplayed the potential impact of the 
Amendment. At the 2015 U.S. Sentencing Commission Annual Training Seminar, 
District of Washington, D.C. Assistant U.S. Attorney, Arvind Lal predicted little 
change from the 2015 Amendment because he believes courts are largely applying 
mitigating role reductions as they should be.78 District of Puerto Rico Judge, 
Gustavo Gelpí, in the same panel, noted that First Circuit Court of Appeals 
precedent gives judges extensive leeway to deny role adjustments—for example, 
based on the quantity of the drugs.79 Indeed, groups with similar values have 
expressed different expectations about the proposed amendment’s desirability.80 
This is problematic. All parties to criminal cases must mutually understand the 
guideline for it to be effective. The guideline is not just critical at the sentencing 
hearing. Prosecutors and defense attorneys must also understand mitigating role 
starting from their plea negotiations (to inform their risk calculi regarding trial). 
As discussed throughout this Note, the Mitigating Role Guideline is plagued 
by severe application problems, which the 2015 Amendment fails to adequately 
address. Unlike the 2014 Drugs-Minus-Two and earlier crack cocaine amendments, 
the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment was not buttressed by substantial research 
outlining the problem the Amendment is aimed at addressing. Rather, the 2015 
Amendment—focusing on two circuit rules, which were not the only possible 
options—reads more like a mere cosmetic adjustment: 
The amendment generally adopts the approach of the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits, revising the commentary to specify that, when determining 
mitigating role, the defendant is to be compared with the other participants 
“in the criminal activity.” Focusing the court’s attention on the individual 
defendant and the other participants is more consistent with the other 
provisions of Chapter Three, Part B.81 
Thus, following the Amendment, courts are told to limit their comparisons to 
a smaller universe of participants in the offense, and are given a sprinkling of 
additional factors to consider.82 But the First Circuit—singled out by the 
Amendment—has already ignored the Amendment in United States v. Carela.83 In 
 
78. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Panel, Role in the Offense, Sept. 17, 2015 (observed by the 
author) (notes on file with the author). 
79. Id. 
80. Federal and Community Defenders expressed “reservations” about whether minor tweaks 
in guideline language would achieve the amendment’s goal. See Mitigating Role Statements, supra note 
68. Meanwhile, for example, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, professed overall acceptance for 
the proposal. See Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Comment Letter on Proposed Amendment 
No.5-Mitigating Role to the Sentencing Guidelines at 2–3 (Mar. 18, 2015) http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-comment/20150318/FAMM.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
R6YP-VUVN]. 
81. U.S.S.G, supra note 8, supp. to app. C, amend 794, at 117. 
82. Id. (noting that the factors include: “(i) the degree to which the defendant understood the 
scope and structure of the criminal activity; (ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in 
planning or organizing the criminal activity; and (iii) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit 
from the criminal activity.”). 
83. See 805 F.3d 374 (1st Cir. 2015). 
Final to Printer_Lerman (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2018  8:48 AM 
694 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:679 
Carela, the First Circuit continued the very test the Commission disavowed in the 
2015 Amendment.84 Where the Commission expressly clarified the Seventh/Ninth 
Circuit rule was the correct one, the First Circuit flaunted its incongruent rule days 
after the Amendment became law.85 Yet, even if courts make an effort to follow the 
Amendment, serious application problems remain unaccounted for and 
unaddressed. 
III. THE GUIDELINES SHOULD BE AMENDED TO ADDRESS THE KINGPIN-
LENGTH SENTENCES RECEIVED BY MANY LOW-LEVEL COURIERS AND MULES 
In drug cases, the mitigating role adjustment (when granted) ostensibly 
minimizes the impact of the kingpin-quantity-based guidelines on low-level 
defendants. But these low-level defendants are still vulnerable to the Guidelines’ 
brutally long sentences. To make matters worse, defendants with the lowest 
involvement often face harsher consequences than others with greater involvement 
because—in a system built around cooperation—these pawns of the drug 
conspiracies have no information to bargain with.86 Worse yet, many—lacking 
experience in the criminal justice system—simply spill their guts at the wrong time.87 
If a defendant invokes her Miranda rights upon arrest, there is a greater chance she 
will get more credit for information she actually has if it is turned over directly to 
the prosecutor who handles her case.88 Plus, if she lacks knowledge of the drug 
trafficking organization, a defendant cannot prove she is substantially less culpable 
than the average participant. Thus, without such proof she will not even get a 
mitigating role reduction—let alone a reduction for cooperation. 
A. Targeting Jurisdictional Obstacles 
First, the Commission should amend the mitigating role guideline by directly 
targeting obstacles in jurisdictions that tend not to apply it.89 As discussed above, 
the same set of facts judged in different federal jurisdictions can result in wildly 
divergent sentencing outcomes. This results from a variety of factors enabled by an 
insufficiently clear guideline. Other guidelines are not activated or deactivated until 
 
84. Id. at 384 (describing that for a defendant to qualify for a minor role reduction, “he must 
satisfy a two-pronged test: (1) ‘he must demonstrate that he is less culpable than most of those involved 
in the offenses of conviction;’ and, (2) ‘he must establish that he is less culpable than most of those 
who have perpetrated similar crimes.’”). 
85. Although the court decided Carela on November 4, 2015, id. at 374, the Amendment took 
effect on November 1, 2015. U.S.S.G., supra note 8. 
86. See MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 171 (“[O]ffenders who performed 
high-level functions generally obtained relief for substantial assistance at higher rates False The highest 
rates of relief based on substantial assistance were for Manager (50.0%) and Organizer/Leader (39.1%). 
The lowest rates of relief based on substantial assistance were for Mule (19.5%), Street-Level Dealer 
(23.4%), and Courier (27.1%).”). 
87. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 14, at 73. 
88. See id. (“The disadvantage low-level drug offenders face compared to those at a higher level 
is called the ‘cooperation paradox.’”). 
89. See Letter to Saris, supra note 56, at 3. 
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mitigating role is granted, so most courier defendants face a treacherous “cliff” at 
the time of sentencing. While mitigating role reduces the offense level by only two 
to four points, it has the potential to trigger substantial additional reductions 
through Role Cap and the Methamphetamine Enhancement.90 
1. Geographic Disparity 
Disparate application of mitigating role adjustments arbitrarily elevates 
sentences for similarly situated defendants in different geographic regions. Sixteen 
years ago, a law review comment by former Parole Commission case analyst, 
Timothy Tobin, illustrated federal courts’ disparate, unpredictable treatment of drug 
couriers91 with the anecdote of a “peasant farmer” recruited by a Columbian92 drug 
trafficking organization to bring three kilograms of heroin to the United States on 
a commercial airline flight. Tobin pointed out the unfairness that would likely result 
depending on which U.S. city the courier landed in and was caught in. Depending 
on the district court judge sentencing the courier, and that judge’s interpretation of 
the mitigating role guideline, the sentence could either be between 151–188 months, 
between 121–151 months, or between 97–121 months.93 
Fast-forward from 1999 to the present, we see a situation in which much 
tinkering has occurred yet much remains the same, or worse. Couriers or mules are 
devastatingly worse off in some districts and before some judges—and this depends 
mainly on where they are arrested, which Assistant U.S. Attorney prosecutes them, 
and which judge they face at sentencing.94 If they arrive in the Middle District of 
Florida or get the wrong judge in the Southern District of California, even first-time 
couriers or mules can expect no mitigating role adjustments, and very long 
sentences.95 If they arrive in another district, such as the Eastern District of New 
 
90. See supra Table 1. 
91. Timothy P. Tobin, Comment, Drug Couriers: A Call for Action by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1055 (1999). 
92. Notably, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the principal drug-smuggling corridor shifted 
from the Colombia-Eastern United States to Northwest Mexico-Southwest United States as the DEA 
crackdown on Colombian cartels enhanced the market control of Mexican cartels. See HOWARD 
CAMPBELL, DRUG WAR ZONE: FRONTLINE DISPATCHES FROM THE STREETS OF EL PASO AND 
JUÁREZ 41 (Univ. of Texas Press 2009). Thus, the typical courier was transformed from an airline 
passenger arriving at an eastern U.S. airport to an automobile driver arriving at a terrestrial port of entry 
or a pedestrian carrying drugs across the border on their person. 
93. Tobin, supra note 91, at 1055. 
94. See Letter from Marjorie Meyers, Chair, Fed. Def. Sentencing Guidelines Comm.,  
Fed. Pub. Def. for the S.D. Tex., to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 4 n.4 
( July 25, 2014). 
95. Compare United States v. Hurtado, 760 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming a 
forty-six-month sentence and mitigating role denial for 11.64-kilograms-of-cocaine importation  
by a defendant in Criminal History Category I who drove a truck across the border with the drug  
hidden in it), with United States v. Leitch, No. 11–CR–00609 ( JG), 2013 WL 753445, at *4, 14 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) (accepting deferred prosecution agreement dismissing charges entirely for 
13.2-kilograms-of-cocaine importation by defendant in Criminal History Category I who crossed the 
border on a commercial airline flight with the drug hidden in her luggage). 
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York, they may receive a two- or four-level mitigating role reduction, along with 
accompanying reductions under Sections 2D1.1(a)(5) and 2D1.1(b)(5).96 
Further, if a courier has the luck of being in certain districts, she may even get 
a non-custodial sentence through a diversion program.97 In the 2015 Fiscal Year, in 
the Eastern District of New York, over ten percent of drug trafficking offenders 
received a non-custodial sentence.98 In contrast, in the District of Puerto Rico, only 
eight out of 580 (roughly 1.4%) drug trafficking offenders received a non-custodial 
sentence.99 The difference in average drug trafficking sentences across districts is 
stark. Admittedly, districts may have wide variation as to the drug type and quantity 
associated with drug offense. However, the fact that the Southern District of 
California has an average sentence of forty-five months,100 the Western District of 
Texas has an average of sixty-three months,101 while Puerto Rico has an average of 
seventy-eight months102 is likely significant. Nationally, mitigating role adjustments 
are deployed minimally. In 2013, just 17.9% of drugs cases benefited from 
mitigating role adjustments.103 In some districts, the adjustment remains woefully 
underused. In 2014, just 6.5% of District of Puerto Rico cases received a mitigating 
role reduction.104 In contrast, in the same year, courts in the Southern District of 
California granted a mitigating role adjustment in 32.1% of cases.105 
 
96. See Leitch, 2013 WL 753445, at *13–14 n.26 (describing the Attorney-General-authorized 
early disposition program for “drug courier cases arising out of John F. Kennedy International Airport” 
in the Eastern District of New York). 
97. Notwithstanding the Guidelines’ virtual eradication of non-custodial sentences, in recent 
years, diversionary programs have sprouted up in districts across the country (including in California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, South Carolina, and Washington). See id. at *3 n.25. Notably, some programs are 
pre-plea diversion, which means that defendants may completely avoid a conviction if they make 
progress in rehabilitation. 
98. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, EASTERN 
DISTRICT N.Y., http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-and-sourcebooks/2015/stats_NYE.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH4M-CZPH]. 
99. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, P.R., http://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2015/stats_PR.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYY5-NJUD]. 
100. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, CAL., 
SOUTHERN, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-and-sourcebooks/2015/stats_CAS.pdf [https://perma.cc/GUJ2-NYFC]. 
101. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2014 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, TEX., 
WESTERN, http://www.USSC.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/stats_TXW.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZA9-S9RM]. 
102. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 99. 
103. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, at A-42, http://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/2013_ 
Annual_Report_Chap5_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/G56Q-2LVN]. 
104. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, http://isb.ussc.gov/Login (Select “All Tables and Figures,” then select “Guideline 
Application” and click on “Offenders Receiving Each Chapter Three Guideline Adjustment.” Display 
function can be limited to specific circuits or districts.). 
105. Id. (narrowing display function to Southern District of California). 
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2. Appellate Court Decisions Perpetuate Role-Reduction Disparities 
Drug trafficking offenses are the most common crimes prosecuted in federal 
courts.106 The defendants are most commonly apprehended while crossing into the 
United States along the U.S.-Mexico border in California, Arizona, New Mexico, or 
Texas.107 Thus, to the extent that circuit law actually impacts district court decision-
making, the critical circuits are the Ninth, which encompasses California and 
Arizona, the Tenth, which includes New Mexico, and the Fifth, covering Texas.108 
Further, the Eleventh Circuit decisions are significant because that circuit includes 
Florida,109 which is also a major entry point for northbound contraband. Finally, the 
First Circuit, which includes Puerto Rico—and often includes interdictions in 
international waters110—receives a significant share of mule and courier cases. 
Among the problems with case law is that guideline changes liberalizing 
mitigating role have not percolated into the circuits’ express interpretations. While 
the effect is hard—or even impossible—to measure, fact-based, totality-of-
circumstances determinations give great deference to sentencing judges, and 
sentencing decisions face little pressure on appeal. 
For example, regarding couriers and mules, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits still 
stubbornly rely on case law that predates significant guideline amendments. The 
Ninth Circuit’s pre-2015 mitigating role cases, Rodriguez-Castro and Hurtado, rely on 
precedent that preceded and is inconsistent with Amendment 635 (2001), 
Amendment 640 (2002), Amendment 750 (2011), Amendment 755 (2011), and the 
Commission’s consistent, published research into the structure and operation of 
drug-trafficking organizations.111 
The Ninth Circuit’s leading mitigating role case, United States v. Hurtado,112 
lays out a standard that is contrary not only to the text of Section 3B1.2, but also to 
the last few iterations of amendments113 aimed at curbing mitigating role denials. 
While the court in Hurtado paid lip service to the guideline’s totality-of-the-
 
106. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2014,  
at 40 fig. J, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-
sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2014_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf (noting 
that drug trafficking cases made up 31.7% of cases, more than any other category.) [https:// 
perma.cc/56VP-TYLE]. 
107. See U.S. SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL WASHINGTON, 
D.C. (May 05, 2010) (testimony of Kevin L. Perkins and Anthony P. Placido), https://archives.fbi.gov/
archives/news/testimony/drug-trafficking-violence-in-mexico-implications-for-the-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/R7HN-DWZX]. 
108. Louisiana and Mississippi do not share a land border with Mexico, but are positioned to 
receive drug shipments by sea. 
109. It also includes Alabama and Georgia. 
110. These cases are frequently brought under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. See 
generally 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-08 (2015). 
111. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 3, United States  
v. Hurtado, 760 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-50170). 
112. See Hurtado, 760 F.3d 1065. 
113. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, amends. 635, 640, 755 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014). 
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circumstances test,114 it disregarded that analysis by stating that any one of three 
factors alone would have sufficed to deny mitigating role.115 
For years, Federal and Community Defenders and other public defense 
practitioners have cried out for justice in direct appeals, petitions for rehearing en 
banc, and petitions for certiorari to no avail.116 Essentially, in the Ninth Circuit, even 
if a defendant transports drugs for the first time with virtually no knowledge of the 
drug trafficking organization that recruits her, she can be denied a role reduction—
and huge role-reduction-dependent decreases—(1) because the amount of contra-
band she has exceeds a certain quantity (a threshold apparently defined on the spot 
by the sentencing court without empirical data); (2) because of the amount of money 
the drug trafficking organization pays her (a threshold apparently also defined by 
the sentencing court without empirical data); or (3) because she engaged in  
a mundane preparatory action (e.g., making a trip to the DMV).117 The Ninth 
Circuit’s single-factor analysis in Hurtado took hold as a mechanism to summarily 
dispense with mitigating-role denial appeals.118 
As Hurtado illustrated in his petition for rehearing,119 the Ninth Circuit’s 
continued citation of cases like United States v. Lui,120 or United States v. Hursh,121 
perpetuate “an unduly parsimonious attitude to the applicability of the role 
adjustment to couriers and applies reasoning that is either inconsistent with later 
amendments or was expressly abjured by the Sentencing Commission after those 
decisions were filed.”122 Even as the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment was set to 
take effect, the Ninth Circuit’s mitigating-role-denial review was approaching the 
brevity of haiku writing.123 Yet, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the 2015 Mitigating 
Role Amendment in 2016, in United States v. Quintero-Leyva, where it held that 
district courts must consider the factors set out in the 2015 Amendment.124 The 
 
114. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 3B1.2 Comment 3(C); see also United States v. Rodriguez-
Castro, 641 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2011). 
115. See Hurtado, 760 F.3d at 1069 (“It properly considered the quantity of drugs, the amount 
paid to Hurtado, and the fact that he allowed the truck to be registered in his name. Any of these facts 
alone may justify denial of a minor role.”) (citing Rodriguez-Castro, 641 F.3d at 1193); see also United States 
v. Hursh, 217 F.3d 761, 770 (9th Cir. 2000). 
116. See, e.g., Hurtado, 760 F.3d 1065. 
117. See id. at 1069. 
118. See, e.g., United States v. Valle-Mendevil, 619 F. App’x 660, 661 (9th Cir. 2015) (reciting 
Hurtado’s holding). 
119. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 111, at 3. 
120. 941 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991). 
121. 217 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2000). 
122. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 111, at 3–4. 
123. See United States v. Gaytan–Salim, 619 F. App’x 671 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming district 
court mitigating role denial in seven short sentences). 
124. See United States v. Quintero-Leyva, 823 F.3d 519, 523–24 (9th Cir. 2016). The court also 
reversed two other cases heard on the same day: United States v. Lopez-Diaz, 650 F. App’x 359 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (involving a mule crossing in the pedestrian lane with 220 grams of meth who admitted to 
crossing on previous occasions and received a fifty-seven-month sentence from Judge Burns), and 
United States v. Enriquez, 650 F. App’x 360 (9th Cir. 2016) (adjusting a ninety-six-month sentence for 
10.36 kilos of meth from 2012, and subsequently resentencing several times by Judge Benitez.). 
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Ninth Circuit recognized some authority of the Sentencing Commission, in 
requiring courts to consider the 2015 Amendment’s factors and applying the 
Amendment retroactively on direct appeal.125 Yet, the Ninth Circuit did not 
expressly address whether the Amendment superseded (or overruled) the 
conflicting case law mentioned above. 
Indeed, as other courts of appeal slowly take notice of the 2015 Mitigating 
Role Amendment, its relation decades old case law remains unclear. In the adjacent 
Fifth Circuit, the cornerstone mitigating role cases are almost thirty years old. The 
Fifth Circuit still relies on two 1989 cases, United States v. Gallegos126 and United 
States v. Buenrostro,127 to deny mitigating role in courier cases. In Gallegos, the court 
upheld the denial of mitigating role reductions for a pair of defendants convicted of 
importing just 100 grams of heroin,128 and spelled out a standard under which it is 
virtually impossible to reverse district courts that deny defendants the mitigating 
role reduction. One of the defendants in Gallegos fit the minimal role application 
note to the letter; he was “recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction 
involving a small amount of drugs.”129 In Buenrostro, the defendant was convicted 
after transporting eighteen kilograms of heroin across the border in his car.130 
Buenrostro argued he was entitled to a minimal role adjustment because drug 
traffickers led him to believe he was transporting marijuana and he was hired as a 
one-time courier—consistent with the minimal role application note.131 The Fifth 
Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of a mitigating role adjustment, reasoning 
the judge acted within his discretion to deny the adjustment based on the quantity 
of drugs.132 
In late 2016, in United States v. Castro, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the 2015 
Mitigating Role Amendment, but continued to rely on Buenrostro for the proposition 
that a person could “‘be a courier without being substantially less culpable than the 
average participant.’”133 The Castro decision appears to permit business as usual in 
Fifth Circuit. While the Fifth Circuit emphasized that district courts must consider 
the factors set forth in the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment, it affirmed the district 
court’s sentence even though the district court failed to expressly address five 
factors introduced by the amendment.134 
Similarly, until recently, judges in the Middle District of Florida relied 
anachronistically on a 1999 Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. Rodriguez De 
 
125. See Quintero-Leyva, 823 F.3d at 524. 
126. See 868 F.2d 711, 712–13 (5th Cir. 1989). 
127. See 868 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1989). 
128. 868 F.2d at 712. 
129. Id. at 713. 
130. 868 F.2d at 136. 
131. Id. at 137. 
132. See id. at 138–39. 
133. United States v. Castro, 843 F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Buenrostro, 868 F.2d at 
138). 
134. See id. at 613 n.4 (“The court did not err by not expressly weighing Amendment 794’s 
factors.”). 
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Varon to deny role adjustments.135 The De Varon decision “discourages application 
of the mitigating role adjustment ‘when a drug courier’s relevant conduct is limited 
to her own act of importation’ or because the amount of drugs ‘may be the best 
indication of the magnitude of the courier’s participation.’”136 In September 2016, 
the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded in United States v. Cruickshank where 
the district relied on drug quantity as the “only factor” for denying a role adjustment 
under De Varon.137 The Eleventh Circuit, however, still referred to De Varon as its 
leading case,138 and called for a future standard that will take into account De Varon 
and the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment.139 
Based on appellate courts’ apparent agnosticism regarding past amendments, 
whether they will credit the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment remains an open 
question. Further, it is also an open question whether assistant U.S. attorneys will 
incorporate the amendment’s guidance into their plea negotiation. A functional, 
role-based guideline would be much easier for judges, prosecutors, and probation 
officers to follow and far easier to evaluate on appeal. 
B. Courts, Prosecutors, Probation Officers, and Defense Attorneys Rely on Incomplete 
Information about Drug-Trafficking Organizations’ Actual Structures 
Chief among the challenges with establishing sentencing rules for drug 
couriers and mules is the variation (perceived or speculated about) between 
different courier roles.140 The Commission should look to empirical research to 
provide courts with guidance as to how to interpret evidence regarding courier roles. 
First, the acknowledged lack of qualitative data on drug-trafficking organizations 
should caution courts in applying common (mis)perceptions regarding drug-
trafficker roles. In fact, the rule of lenity141 should be invoked in role analysis. “The 
rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, 
there remains a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.’”142 In terms of 
ambiguity or uncertainty, the Commission’s serial revisions to the Mitigating Role 
 
135. United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 942–43 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
136. See Mitigating Role Statements, supra note 68, at 3 (citing United States v. Lormil, 551  
F. App’x 542, 544 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding a Middle District of Florida district court justified 
denying a mitigating role adjustment for a suitcase carrying courier with 2.5 kilograms of cocaine where 
law enforcement could not locate the alleged leaders)). 
137. 837 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir. 2016). 
138. Id. at 1192. 
139. Id. at 1195. 
140. Compare Hurtado, 760 F.3d at 1069 (denial of minor role proper based on quantity of drugs, 
the amount courier was paid or the fact the courier allowed a vehicle to be registered in his name) with 
Leitch, 2013 WL 753445, at *13–14 n.26 (describing the Attorney-General-authorized early disposition 
program for drug courier cases in the Eastern District of New York, which generally provide for a 
minimal role adjustment). 
141. See, e.g., Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 891 (“Especially in the interpretation of a 
criminal statute subject to the rule of lenity, . . . [courts] cannot give the text a meaning that is different 
from its ordinary, accepted meaning, and that disfavors the defendant” (citation omitted).). 
142. Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 
139 (1998)). 
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Guideline speak for themselves.143 These revisions—combined with dissonant 
circuit court interpretations—demonstrate the requisite grievous ambiguity and 
uncertainty in what makes one defendant “substantially less culpable than the 
average participant.”144 Thus, where courts and parties are speculating about role, 
ambiguous determinations should result in findings that favor defendants. 
Second, emerging quantitative studies should caution courts from making too 
much of a single courier’s role characteristics given the relative homogeneity 
regarding key elements of their conduct. 
1. Recent Quantitative Findings Tend to Flatten Out Variation Between Defendants 
While the Guidelines require defendants to litigate their mitigating role 
sentencing claims “from scratch” by laying out the relative roles of people in the 
drug-trafficking organization that recruits them, federal prosecutors in border 
districts refer to courier cases in remarkably generic terminology.145 Recent work by 
former Assistant United States Attorney Caleb Mason with Social Scientist David 
Bjerk illustrates the regularity of courier tasks and courier placement in the 
economic status within drug trafficking organizations.146 Bjerk and Mason describe 
their data set as being made up of “every federal border-smuggling case, or ‘border 
bust’ . . . made at California ports of entry” from late 2006 to 2010.147 
They find that couriers and mules vary in what types of drugs they cross in 
what quantity, and in their pay.148 But on average, couriers’ economic positions vis-
à-vis the enterprise they work for paint a picture of a uniformly powerless, unskilled 
labor force.149 
This author disagrees with Bjerk and Mason’s implication that drug-courier 
work may be a rational way to earn a living, comparable to truck driving.150 Yet, 
 
143.  See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, amends. 635, 640, 755 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014). 
144. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 3B1.2. 
145. See David Bjerk & Caleb Mason, The Market for Mules: Risk and Compensation of Cross-
Border Drug Couriers, 39 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 58, 59 (2014); see generally Human Rights Watch, supra 
note 14, at 12 (“As one former US Attorney told Human Rights Watch, [¶] ‘[t]he public simply does 
not realize how many low-level guys are in [federal] prison. . . . We lock up the lowest fruit in drug 
conspiracies.’”). 
146. See Bjerk & Mason, supra note 145. 
147. Id. at 60. 
148. Id. at 61. 
149. Id. at 59. 
150. Id. The authors substantially discount non-economic risks taken by couriers and mules. 
Bjerk and Mason overstate the agency exerted by couriers and mules, arguing that if a mule is successful 
twice a month, and is able to avoid arrest for a year, she could earn as much as a beginner truck driver. 
Id. They also claim “mules are arguably quite well paid for their courier work, generally being paid one 
and two thousand dollars for a day’s work.” Id. at 70. Simple dollar assessments, however, are 
problematic. Their conclusions both understate the magnitude of the risk of transporting drugs for a 
drug trafficking organization, and undervalue the lives of the desperate people who accept the work. 
In the years covered by Bjerk and Mason’s data sample, a colossal number of deaths were attributed to 
the drug war. From 2007 to 2012, the Mexican government calculated an astonishing 121,683 drug war 
deaths. Más de 121 Mil Muertos, el Saldo de la Narcoguerra de Calderón: Inegi, [More than 121-Thousand 
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their calculations are valuable in resolving many misconceptions that worry 
sentencing judges and the appellate judges scrutinizing their decisions. 
Courier and mule work is virtually a dead-end path. Bjerk and Mason estimate 
that around one-in-ten or one-in-twenty drug loads are detected.151 While many 
people work in dangerous jobs in North America, the danger of a multiyear 
incarceration term dwarfs other work risks both in certainty and in magnitude. It 
would seem that couriers would have better chances making a living betting on 
horses with borrowed money. 
Courier work offers a temporary income increase that would be unlikely in 
most other jobs in the border region. In fact, that is very frequently the reason 
people are willing to accept drug-trafficking organizations’ propositions. Often 
drug-trafficking organization recruiters—like others offering dangerous and risky 
employment—deliberately seek out people in dire circumstances to make them an 
offer they can’t refuse.152 Further, the border region has provided an increasingly 
vulnerable labor pool in the last couple decades.153 The temptation of short-term 
 
Deaths, the Balance of Calderon’s Drug War: Inegi] PROCESO ( July 30, 2013), http://
www.proceso.com.mx/?p=348816 [https://perma.cc/9BZK-U2JT] (showing statistics from 
Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography). Given the virtual eventuality of being arrested 
and imprisoned—along with the possibility of being killed—being a drug courier or mule is a 
tremendously irrational decision, which requires either desperation or some other characteristic 
rendering the person incapable of making a rational decision. Further, mules who carry drugs  
directly on, or inside, their person face risk of injury or even death. See, e.g., Steven Morris, Detecting 
System Criticized After ‘Drug Mule’ Death; THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2007), http://
www.TheGuardian.com/uk/2007/dec/10/immigrationpolicy.drugsandalcohol [https://perma.cc/ 
484J-CGX7]. Couriers typically come from countries in Latin America and the “global south” that tend 
to experience the “drug war” in the literal sense. See Sonia N. Lawrence & Toni Williams, Swallowed 
Up: Drug Couriers at the Borders of Canadian Sentencing, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 285, 285–86 (2006). 
151. Bjerk & Mason, supra note 145, at 71. 
152. See MARIO PUZO, THE GODFATHER 37 (1969). 
153. “For drug trafficking [organizations], NAFTA . . . provided both the infrastructure and 
the [labor] pool to facilitate smuggling, especially during the Fox administration when much of the 
demand for cheap [labor] was transferred to Chinese sweat shops.” PETER WATT & ROBERTO 
ZEPEDA, DRUG WAR MEXICO 161 (1998). Factory “maquila” jobs in Mexican border cities increased 
fourfold from the 1980s to the 1990s, but following the North American Free Trade Agreement, these 
maquilas began to close, expanding the cartels’ labor pool. See id. at 159–60. Mexico, a land of intense 
poverty and extraordinary wealth disparity, tucked under the belly of the United States, presents vast 
pockets of people vulnerable to drug trafficking enterprises’ manipulation. Id. at 230 (noting that in 
Mexico, “the world’s richest man, Carlos Slim, acquires on average another million dollars every hour, 
while the majority live on less than two dollars a day”). In border regions, Mexico’s economic plight is 
particularly salient. Id. 
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financial relief comes at the cost of the extraordinary risk of many years of 
imprisonment154 and death by cartel violence.155 
The empirical market analysis possible about courier labor—that cases can be 
bundled by the thousands and speculated over in economic terms—stands in stark 
contrast to what happens in sentencing courts. On the one hand, point-A-to-point-
B couriers are so standardized that they can be commodified as a uniform labor 
force (thus rendering rather benign the characteristics and motivations of the 
individuals involved)156; on the other hand, the facts of individual cases, when 
prosecuted and sentenced, represent devastating acts of disqualification from 
mercy. 
For the purposes of sentencing couriers and mules, the most informative 
aspect of quantitative studies is that they are possible. Overall, such studies 
demonstrate the “McDonaldization” of drug-trafficking enterprises in the face of 
the drug war.157 Thus, in courier and mule cases, a colossal disconnect exists 
between how the highly structured, multination-drug-trafficking organizations 
impersonally treat their dispensable underlings and how courts, prosecutors, and 
probation officers treat them when prosecuting and sentencing them. 
2. The Mitigating Role Guideline Fails at Providing Sufficient Clarity and Detail to Sentencing 
Courts, Prosecutors, and Probation Officers 
Lacking clear guidance from the Commission, case law, and statutes, judges 
and advocates problematically and inaccurately characterize drug amounts as 
indicative of defendants’ roles and their positions in the enterprises that recruit 
them. Commission guidance—for decades—gave the example of a one-time 
transaction with a “small amount” of drugs as an offense that would qualify for 
mitigating role.158 But no one can agree on what a “small amount” of drugs is. Four 
 
154. Bjerk and Mason calculate expected sentence value based on correlations between courier 
pay and sentences for those who are arrested and convicted. Bjerk & Mason, supra note 145, at 62–67. 
Smuggling certain drugs pays more than others; and as the drug quantity goes up, the possible sentence 
goes up and so does the pay. Id. The cartels can be seen to operate like a casino: couriers bet years of 
their freedom—the number of which is now known to social scientists following years of data collection 
and regression analysis—in exchange for a possible cash payout. Given the complexity of calculating 
such sentence values and the generalized “labor costs” for couriers and mules, there is virtually no 
chance that couriers bargain with their handlers as to the amount of risk they will shoulder and what 
compensation they are willing to expect. 
155. See PROCESO, supra note 150. 
156. It is precisely these mundane details, which should be granted the benefit of the rule of 
lenity under the current mitigating role regime. As described supra Section III.B, where offense factors 
could be reasonably seen as mitigating or aggravating, courts should err toward the interpretation 
favoring the defendant. 
157. See GEORGE RITZER, THE MCDONALDIZATION OF SOCIETY (2007). Ritzer sees the fast 
food industry as a paramount example of a modern societal trend to value efficiency, predictability, and 
calculability above all else. This trend is manifest in multinational drug trafficking enterprises where 
labor is standardized and compartmentalized. Just as the fast food industry divides labor up into 
unskilled tasks, so do drug cartels. 
158. Prior to Amendment 635 in 2001, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 Comment 2, read: “It is intended that 
the downward adjustment for a minimal participant will be used infrequently. It would be appropriate, 
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years of Southern California border-bust data revealed that drug couriers carried an 
average of sixty kilograms and a median of thirty.159 In contrast, circuit court cases 
miss the mark by affirming mitigating role denial based on quantity for quantities 
in relatively low ranges.160 
If anything, under Section 3B1.2’s comparison to co-participants,161 high 
quantity may very well cut the other direction. That a drug-trafficking operation is 
transporting a large quantity of drugs is indicative of an organization that contains 
high-level drug traffickers with greater culpability. In other words, if an organization 
is capable of trafficking larger quantities of drugs, it is likely to have more higher 
culpability participants. Larger drug trafficking enterprises—with greater need to 
launder their proceeds and establish their place among competing organizations—
may be more likely to engage in high-level financial and violent crimes thereby 
elevating a given enterprise’s average participant. 
Judges’ “assessments” of trust within the criminal enterprise understandably 
lack nuance. The cases coming before courts all look similar—reflecting patterns 
of enforcement rather than enterprise structure—and mask the critical dimensions 
of the enterprise. Drug cartels are run by violence, which is largely facilitated by 
militarization in Latin American drug-export and drug-transit countries and white-
collar crime.162 Thus, when courts magnify individual case nuances—whether a 
courier owned the car, or the car was registered in her name, etc.—it distracts from 
the compelling similarities shared by the “class” of drug couriers. 
 
for example, for someone who played no other role in a very large drug smuggling operation than to 
offload part of a single marihuana shipment, or in a case where an individual was recruited as a courier 
for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs.” U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 3B1.3 
Comment 2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2000). 
159. Bjerk & Mason, supra note 145, at 61. Notably, the data set includes mules crossing the 
border on foot with presumably much smaller quantities. Subtracting pedestrians, both the mean and 
median would be significantly higher. 
160. See supra Section III.A.2; Cruickshank, 837 F.3d at 1195 (maintaining drug quantity as a 
permissible factor—among others—for determining mitigating role eligibility after the 2015 Mitigating 
Role Amendment). 
161. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3B1.2, at 364–66. 
162. WATT & ZEPEDA, supra note 153, at 232 (noting that in Mexico, “the financial and political 
structure that allows drug trafficking to flourish has remained all but untouched. . . . [D]rug trafficking 
in Mexico has been, for a long time, facilitated by official complicity, by white collar crime. . . . 
[N]arcotrafficking over the last century has been a component part of the state apparatus.”). A more 
recent example of Mexican state-cartel collusion is the forced disappearance of forty-three students  
in Guerrero in 2014, which was carried out through coordinated efforts by drug traffickers and  
law enforcement officers. See generally Francisco Goldman, Mexico’s Missing Forty-Three: One Year, 
Many Lies, and a Theory that Might Make Sense, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2015) https:// 
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/mexicos-missing-forty-three-one-year-many-lies-and-a-
theory-that-might-make-sense [https://perma.cc/9R3K-ZWA2]. A larger example is the case of 
HSBC’s being caught laundering at least $881 million in drug proceeds, which it received as bulk cash 
deposits. See generally Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA  
N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.Justice.gov/opa/pr/HSBC-Holdings-Plc-and-
HSBC-Bank-USA-NA-Admit-Anti-Money-Laundering-and-Sanctions-Violations [https://perma.cc/ 
NRS3-EC5B]. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
As described throughout, the Commission has not succeeded in over twenty-
five years of tinkering to create a workable mitigating role guideline that achieves 
the paramount goal of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities. Further, the 
amendments that have been made have failed to take hold in most federal circuits.163 
Thus, in addition to revising the mitigating role guideline, the Commission should 
act quickly to decouple mitigating-role-dependent guidelines by modifying role-
dependent guidelines, role cap and the methamphetamine enhancement (Sections 
2D1.1(a)(5) and (b)(5)).164 
A. Section 3B1.2 Mitigating Role Should Contain a Functional Role Analysis 
During the comment process for the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment, 
Federal and Community Defenders provided several meaningful comments that the 
Commission did not act upon. First, Defenders critiqued the lukewarm language 
change from “is not precluded from consideration” to “may receive an adjustment,” 
noting that desirable language would indicate that defendants “should generally 
receive an adjustment.”165 In addition to the obstacles mentioned above, effective 
Guideline amendment is delayed by a lack of representation on the Commission by 
the most relevant stakeholders. While federal prosecutors have a permanent seat at 
the Commission’s table, Federal and Community Defenders, a group uniquely 
situated as a proper counterbalance, is kept outside formative Commission 
developments.166 Their voice is particularly important because Defenders are poised 
to target sources of injustice that would escape the Commission’s bird’s-eye analysis 
of sentencing issues, and would be less likely to be perceived by prosecutors and 
probation department officials. 
Unlike previous amendments, adding a provision to allow role-based 
mitigating role grants for couriers, mules, and even street-level dealers would be far 
easier to address on appeal and may plausibly percolate up through deferential 
appellate standards. If “courier” and “mule” have clear definitions under the 
Guidelines, and the facts support a determination that a defendant is a courier, it is 
more likely that a circuit court would step in to reverse a district court’s role-
reduction denial. 
 
163. See, e.g., United States v. Hurtado, 760 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014); see also supra Section 
III.A.2. But see United States v. Quintero-Leyva, 823 F.3d 519, 524 (9th Cir. 2016). 
164. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(a)(5) and (b)(5). 
165. Mitigating Role Statements, supra note 68, at 1. 
166. Id. As of November 2016, six of seven commissioners were district attorneys, state 
attorneys general, or assistant U.S. attorneys before becoming commissioners. About the Commissioners, 
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/commissioners [https://perma.cc/ 
AZ8P-VVT4] (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
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B. Section 2D1.1(a)(5)’s Role Cap Provision Should Include Average Participants, Not 
Just Minor and Minimal Participants 
While the Mitigating Role Guideline necessarily must leave room for 
application to myriad other offenses, the role cap provision applies only to drug 
offenses. Thus, the Role Cap guideline is the ideal place to “clean up” mitigating 
role application issues and correct for the underuse of mitigating role. Decoupling 
Role Cap from Mitigating Role will insulate low-level defendants from errors and 
inconsistencies in how courts apply mitigating role. 
The Role Cap provision makes exceptions for base offense levels based on the 
Drug Quantity Table: 
The offense level specified in the Drug Quantity Table set forth in 
subsection (c), except that if (A) the defendant receives an adjustment 
under §3B1.2 (Mitigating Role); and (B) the base offense level under 
subsection (c) is (i) level 32, decrease by 2 levels; (ii) level 34 or level 36, 
decrease by 3 levels; or (iii) level 38, decrease by 4 levels. If the resulting 
offense level is greater than level 32 and the defendant receives the 4-level 
(“minimal participant”) reduction in §3B1.2(a), decrease to level 32.167 
In effect, the Role Cap provision recalibrates base offense levels for any 
defendants who can prove that they qualify for mitigating role reductions and have 
a drug-quantity-based offense level of thirty-two or higher. The last sentence of the 
provision applies additional reductions for defendants deemed minimal participants 
whose original offense level is thirty-six or higher. In that case, the guideline 
instructs courts to reduce the offense level to thirty-two. In other words, it reflects 
a policy choice that no minimal participant should have an offense level higher than 
thirty-two. 
The Commission implemented Role Cap through Amendment 640 expressly 
with couriers, mules and other low-level functionaries in mind.168 Citing couriers 
and mules as examples of defendants whose actual culpability was not accurately 
reflected in the amount of drugs they transport, the Commission sought to ratchet 
down the amount-linked sentencing ranges: 
[T]he amendment modifies [§ 2D1.1(a)(5)] to provide a maximum base 
offense level of level 30 if the defendant receives and adjustment under § 
3B1.2 (Mitigating Role). The maximum base offense level somewhat limits 
the sentencing impact of drug quantity for offenders who perform 
relatively low level trafficking functions, have little authority in the drug 
trafficking organization, and have a lower degree of individual culpability 
(e.g., “mules” or “couriers” qualify for a mitigating role adjustment). [¶] 
This part of the amendment responds to concerns that base offense levels 
derived from the Drug Quantity Table in § 2D1.1 overstate the culpability 
 
167. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(a)(5), at 150. 
168. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, vol. II, amend. 640, reason for amend., at 258  
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2002). 
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of certain drug offenders who meet the criteria for a mitigating role 
adjustment under § 3B1.2.169 
The rationale behind Role Cap, that the Drug Quantity Table overstates 
culpability for certain defendants, remains unquestioned. Indeed, it is supported by 
the Commission’s consistent, nationwide research on the structure and operation 
of drug-trafficking organizations.170 The Drugs-Minus-Two Amendment lends 
broader support for the proposition that the Drug Quantity Table is indefensibly 
harsh.171 
Yet, by limiting Role Cap application to defendants who can prove they are 
substantially less culpable than average participants and thus receive a mitigating 
role adjustment, the guideline presumes a functioning mitigating role guideline. As 
illustrated throughout this Note, the mitigating role guideline remains problematic, 
and circuit courts have been largely unresponsive to amendment attempts. Thus, 
the intent behind Amendment 640 should be decoupled from mitigating role. That 
is, Section 2D1.1(a)(5) should be amended to ensure its deployment for all 
“relatively low level trafficking functions, [who] have little authority in the drug 
trafficking organization, and have a lower degree of individual culpability (e.g., 
‘mules’ or ‘couriers’ . . . ).”172 This specific modification will be best accomplished 
by extending § 2D1.1(a)(5) to all drug-trafficking defendants who do not qualify for 
an aggravating role as follows: 
The offense level specified in the Drug Quantity Table set forth in 
subsection (c), except that if (A) the defendant does not receives an 
adjustment under §3B1.2 §3B1.1 (Mitigating Aggravating Role); and (B) 
the base offense level under subsection (c) is (i) level 32, decrease by 2 
levels; (ii) level 34 or level 36, decrease by 3 levels; or (iii) level 38, decrease 
by 4 levels. . . .173 
With that simple modification, Section 2D1.1(a)(5) will undoubtedly cap 
offense levels for defendants in low-level functions with little authority, and lower 
individual culpability. But the analysis will be liberated from the mitigating role 
guideline’s vague requirement to compare each defendant with so-called average 
participants combined with treacherous circuit court jurisprudence supporting 
mitigating role denial for a number of reasons that fail to reflect defendants’ 
function, authority or culpability. 
The expansion of Role Cap to “average,” not just minor or minimal 
participants, may be vulnerable to criticism on speculation that some very 
detrimental drug traffickers will “slip through the cracks” and receive too low a 
 
169. Id. at 259. 
170. See supra Section II. 
171. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, supp. to app. C, amend. 782, at 64–71 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014). 
172. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, vol. II, amend. 640, reason for amend., at 259  
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2002). 
173. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(a)(5) (with this Note’s proposed amendments). 
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sentence.174 This is unlikely, however, given the availability of other sentencing 
enhancements including, for example, using firearms,175 and abusing a position of 
trust,176—not to mention, judges’ expansive discretion to sentence above the a 
properly calculated guideline range under section 3553(a). 
As a final note to this Section, this modest modification would effectively 
breathe the rule of lenity into role determinations in drug cases. At least for Role 
Caps, defendants in ambiguous situations would be given the benefit of the doubt. 
Low-level defendants often legitimately lack the requisite knowledge to overcome 
their burden to prove their roles are minor or minimal. After all, lacking authority 
in the organization, they lack access to information about other participants. Like 
fast-food-restaurant employees, couriers and mules have a “street level” view of the 
organization. Thus, this amendment will serve as a step away from presuming drug 
defendants should receive sentences fit for kingpins and a step toward requiring the 
government to first prove elevated status—beginning with proving that a defendant 
was a manager, a supervisor, or leader within the meaning of Section 3B1.1 in order 
to negate Role Cap application. 
C. Section 2D1.1(b)(5)’s Increase for Methamphetamine Should Exclude Average 
Participants, Not Just Minor and Minimal Participants 
While the methamphetamine transporter remains largely similar to 
transporters of other drugs, she is treated disproportionately worse by the 
Guidelines. First, far smaller quantities of methamphetamine trigger higher 
guideline ranges.177 Second, a two-level increase applies to methamphetamine 
importation and to no other drug. Section 2D1.1(b)(5), which provides: 
If (A) the offense involved the importation of amphetamine  
or methamphetamine or the manufacture of amphetamine or  
methamphetamine from listed chemicals that the defendant knew  
were imported unlawfully, and (B) the defendant is not subject to  
an adjustment under §3B1.2 (Mitigating Role), increase by 2 levels.178 
Thus, under Section 2D1.1(b)(5), if a courier or mule defendant has been 
recruited to transport methamphetamine—and is denied a mitigating role 
adjustment—her offense is increased by two levels.179 Section 2D1.1(b)(5) applies 
 
174. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3B1.2, at 364–66. 
175. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2K2.4, at 269–70. 
176. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3B1.3, at 367–68. 
177. See infra text accompanying note 178 (discussing the Comprehensive Methamphetamine 
Act of 1996). 
178. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(b)(5), at 145. Section 2D1.1(b)(5) was added in 1997 as 
part of multipart Amendment 555, in response to the “Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. 104-237, 110 Stat. 3099, including the directives to the Commission in sections 301 
and 303 of that Act.” U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, vol. I, amend. 555, at 516. Congress directed the 
Commission in section 301 of the Act to cut each base offense level’s drug quantity in half for 
methamphetamine (e.g. where three kilograms of methamphetamine triggered a given base offense 
level, that quantity dropped to 1.5 kilograms for same offense level). Id. 
179. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(b)(5), at 151. 
Final to Printer_Lerman (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2018  8:48 AM 
2017] COURIERS, NOT KINGPINS 709 
to a significant number of cases. Nationally, in 2014, there were 6229 
methamphetamine trafficking cases, which accounted for over twenty-nine percent 
of all drug trafficking cases.180 Notably, the Commission’s justification for adding 
Section 2D1.1(b)(5) to the guidelines was not justified by any difference in the  
role of defendants in methamphetamine offenses. Rather, it was based on a  
generic assertion that evidence indicated “a recent, substantial increase in the 
importation of methamphetamine and precursor chemicals used to manufacture 
methamphetamine.”181 
Methamphetamine has harmfully affected communities throughout the 
United States.182 While the public has become increasingly disillusioned about the 
“war on drugs,” as hysteria mounted regarding methamphetamine,183 the 
government deployed the same strategies against methamphetamine trafficking as 
it has against heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.184 Nonetheless, there is no evidence 
that the functional role of a low-level courier or mule is any different for this 
prohibited drug than for any other. Further, as many practitioners report, the drug 
trafficking organizations often tell a courier that what she is transporting is 
marijuana (possibly to assuage any remorse related to involvement with the more 
harmful drug), or deliberately keep the courier in the dark about what the substance 
is so they will work for less remuneration.185 
The following simple modification will alleviate the risk of this provision being 
applied to defendants who are unfairly denied a mitigating role adjustment or who 
do not have sufficient information to prove they are substantially less culpable than 
the average participant. 
If (A) the offense involved the importation of amphetamine or 
methamphetamine or the manufacture of amphetamine or 
methamphetamine from listed chemicals that the defendant knew were 
imported unlawfully, and (B) the defendant is not subject to an adjustment 
under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) §3B1.2 (Mitigating Role), increase by 2 
levels.186 
The revised guideline will thus apply Section 2D1.1(b)(5) only to those drug 
traffickers with a demonstrated aggravating role. While an effective mitigating role 
 
180. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENTENCING STAT., tbl. 33 
(2014), http://www.USSC.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual- 
reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table33.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9ML-PWC9] [hereinafter 
FED. SENTENCING STAT.]. 
181. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, vol. I, amend. 555, reason for amend., at 517. 
182. See WILLIAM GARRIOTT, POLICING METHAMPHETAMINE: NARCOPOLITICS IN RURAL 
AMERICA 4–5, 22–25 (2011). 
183. See America’s Most Dangerous Drug, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 2005, http://www. 
Newsweek.com/Americas-Most-Dangerous-Drug-117493 [https://perma.cc/Y6BY-V4WL]. 
184. See GARRIOTT, supra note 182, at 34–35. 
185. Thus, in order to construct a factual basis in these cases, many pleas read something like, 
“I knowingly imported a prohibited substance which I admit the government could prove is 
methamphetamine.” 
186. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(b)(5) at 151 (with this Note’s proposed amendments). 
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guideline would alleviate the need for this modification, decades of adjustments 
have justified cynicism about such adjustments taking hold. And even a clear 
mitigating role guideline would not necessarily fix the problem faced by the most 
poorly informed couriers and mules who cannot generate sufficient evidence to 
prove their role is substantially less than average. 
While not all of the methamphetamine offenders in 2014 were exposed to the 
two-level increase,187 a sizable number of the 4325 cases receiving no role 
adjustment188 likely suffered the two-point adjustment. Further, an enormous 
portion of methamphetamine defendants are couriers, and are thus caught in the 
limbo discussed throughout this Note. 
This Note’s proposed modification to Section 2D1.1(b)(5) would prevent 
similar outcomes in the future, and would present no real negative consequences to 
enforcement efforts and government interest in punishing drug offenders with 
elevated roles. As long as the government met its burden of showing aggravating 
role,189 Section 2D1.1(b)(5) would still be activated. But borderline mitigating role 
cases—those likely to get a different outcome depending on the judge adjudicating 
them—would be spared the plus-two increase. Therefore, the paramount policy 
objective of avoiding disparities among similarly situated defendants would be 
served by this revision. Since only 6.1% of methamphetamine trafficking 
defendants receive an aggravating adjustment,190 the dangers of misapplication are 
slight. 
D. The Mitigating Role Guideline or the Aberrant Behavior Guideline 
Should Be Amended to Distinguish the Two 
The Mitigating Role Guideline’s direction to compare defendants to “average 
participants” leads to additional application issues, which, in some courts, includes 
analyzing whether couriers or mules had time to reflect on their involvement 
(aberrant behavior) and how necessary they are to the overall drug-trafficking 
enterprise.191 
 
187. The offense must involve “importation” or manufacture using chemicals known to have 
been “imported unlawfully.” Id. 
188. See FED. SENTENCING STAT., supra note 180, tbl. 40, http://www.USSC.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table40.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EGZ7-QX53]. 
189. Most circuits have held the burden for an adjustment falls on the party seeking it. See, e.g., 
United States v. Howard, 894 F.2d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 1990). But see United States v. Dolan, 701  
F. Supp. 138, 139–40 (E.D. Tenn. 1988) (placing the burden of proof for “acceptance of responsibility” 
on the government because the court believed that the government would have as much access as had 
the defendant to the information necessary to establish whether the defendant had accepted 
responsibility). 
190. See FED. SENTENCING STAT., supra note 180, tbl. 40. 
191. Hurtado, 760 F.3d at 1069 (“That [the defendant’s] supervisors, organizers, recruiters, and 
leaders may have above-average culpability—and thus are subject to aggravating role enhancements 
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1—doesn’t mean that [the defendant] is ‘substantially less culpable than the 
average participant.’” (emphasis omitted)). 
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The Commission should clarify that being a repeat courier, or carrying out 
other mundane tasks, does not preclude a mitigating role adjustment. In other 
words, a functional role analysis should disentangle the actions of couriers from the 
requirements for an aberrant behavior departure.192 The Aberrant Behavior 
Guideline allows for a downward departure under Section 5K2.20 for qualifying 
offenses where “the defendant committed a single criminal occurrence or single 
criminal transaction that (1) was committed without significant planning; (2) was of 
limited duration; and (3) represents a marked deviation by the defendant from an 
otherwise law-abiding life.”193 But some judges’ findings under Section 3B1.2 
appear to confuse role with aberrant behavior.194 The Guidelines should be 
amended to clarify that a lack of aberrancy should not foreclose mitigating role 
reductions. 
The Aberrant Behavior departure serves a distinct purpose from the mitigating 
role adjustment, a sort of sorting function for what could be considered a class of 
offenses with meaningfully underdeveloped intent. The Guidelines should direct 
attention to the defendant’s functional role and clarify that—barring exceptional 
circumstances—low-level couriers are not to be disqualified from role reductions 
based on a lack of aberrancy. 
Although preparation and repetition weigh against aberrant behavior 
departures, couriers’ overall roles in drug trafficking organizations do not 
meaningfully change. On average, couriers are compensated at a trivial percentage 
of the value of the drugs they transport.195 Even if they are compensated 
incrementally higher for riskier endeavors, couriers’ statures in the enterprises do 
not change. Trusted drug-trafficking associates do not shoulder the risks of 
personally transporting drugs across the international border gauntlet of inspectors, 
detection equipment and drug-sniffing dogs. Nevertheless, some judges have found 
that couriers and mules had elevated roles because they engaged in low-skilled 
preparatory activity for drug-smuggling activities. For example, appellate courts 
have affirmed mitigating-role denials based on defendants making practice runs 
(crossing the border first without drugs), or registering cars in their names.196 While 
the Mitigating Role Guideline has been in effect for decades, courts are still 
struggling with how to interpret it even for what have become ordinary scenarios 
for sentencing judges. In February 2016, the Ninth Circuit heard oral argument  
 
192. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 5K2.20(b). 
193. Id. 
194. See, e.g., Hurtado, 760 F.3d at 1069 (holding that a defendant’s allowing a car to be registered 
in his name was a valid ground for denial of a mitigating role adjustment). Allowing the car registration 
to proceed involves planning and duration, and would therefore disqualify someone from relief based 
on aberrancy. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 5K2.20(b). See also Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9, Lopez-
Diaz, 650 F. App’x 359 (No. 14-50050) (9th Cir. 2016) (remanded where district court denied a role 
reduction for defendant who admitted to importing drugs into the United States by foot). 
195. Drug couriers are extremely cheap in relation to the value of the drugs they cross. See Bjerk 
& Mason, supra note 145, at 67–68. 
196. Hurtado, 760 F.3d at 1067–68. 
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in three cases, which are exemplars of how two Southern District of California 
judges have clung to such superficial role tests, United States v. Lopez-Diaz, United 
States v. Enriquez, and United States v. Quintero-Leyva.197 As discussed above in 
Section III.0, the court published an opinion in Quintero-Leyva without directly 
stating whether prior case law remained valid.198 
Even the severest of advice to early Guidelines drafters recommended that 
first-time drug offenders rarely serve sentences over three years.199 The Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), in its 1996 Commentary to the Commission made 
specific sentencing recommendations based on the type/amount of drugs, the 
participant’s role, and whether it was the offender’s first, second, or third drug 
offense conviction.200 While longer sentences were recommended for drug 
defendants with prior drug trafficking convictions, substantially lower sentences 
were recommended for first-time couriers.201 Thus, if a courier is instructed by her 
handler to do a practice run, or if she does courier work on more than one occasion, 
she should not be proscribed from a mitigating role adjustment. 
E. The Mitigating Role Guideline Should Be Amended with Unequivocal Language to 
Disavow Indispensability Determinations 
The 2015 Amendment advises, in lukewarm terms, against denying a 
mitigating role adjustment based on so-called “indispensability” to a drug-
trafficking enterprise.202 The guideline language was changed to state that “certain 
types of [indispensable] defendants” now “may receive” a mitigating role 
adjustment.203 Before the Amendment, defendants were merely “‘not precluded 
from consideration for’ a mitigating role adjustment.”204 
The Amendment does not meaningfully address what practitioners have long 
pointed out are unfair “indispensability justifications”205 upheld by circuit courts 
and apparently permitted by the Guidelines. In the 2015 amendment cycle, Federal 
and Community Defenders and others cautioned the Commission to include in  
its amendment language that would dissuade courts from denying mitigating role 
 
197. United States v. Lopez-Diaz, 650 F. App’x 359 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing a mule crossing 
in the pedestrian lane with 220 grams of methamphetamine, admitted to crossing on previous occasions, 
and received a fifty-seven-month sentence); United States v. Enriquez, 650 F. App’x 360 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(issuing a 96-month sentence to an automobile courier for 10.36 kilograms of methamphetamine in 
2012; the defendant was later issued the same sentence several times after reversal on appeal). 
198. See Quintero-Leyva, 823 F.3d at 522–24 (remanding with instructions to consider Section 
3B1.2’s newly listed factors, but not establishing a clear relationship between Ninth Circuit precedent 
and the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment). 
199. Meierhoefer, supra note 7, at 34. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at app. C, amend. 794, at 118. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Mitigating Role Statements, supra note 68, at 11. 
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based on the “indispensability” of a defendant’s action.206 In a statement to the 
Commission, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers President, 
Theodore Simon, wrote: 
[T]he commentary should make clear that defendants who have played a 
lesser role in the offense are entitled to a mitigating role reduction even  
if the relatively minor role was “indispensable to carrying out the  
plan.” Arguably, every behavior that is part of criminal conduct could be 
indispensable to the completion of the conduct, but that does not make 
every actor equally valuable or equally culpable in the overall scheme. 
Sands’ analogy of drug couriers to delivery truck drivers is completely 
apropos. A business establishment may not be able to sell its merchandise 
if the delivery driver does not transport the goods to the retail store, but 
truck drivers are easily replaceable and minimally paid in the overall scheme 
of the business. Couriers who do nothing more than transport from  
manufacturers to dealers, for little compensation, are less culpable than 
those who manufacture contraband and those who sell it for large 
profits.207 
This clarification is necessary because—lacking clear Commission 
guidance—some courts have habitually disqualified defendants from mitigating 
role adjustments where their functional tasks and responsibilities are insignificant 
relative to their managers, supervisors, kingpins, and others with specials skills or 
ownership interests in contraband.208 Common sense would suggest that the new 
“may receive” language will do little to discourage district court evaluations, which 
are buttressed not only by permissive circuit case law, but also by assumptions about 
defendants. 
As discussed above in Section III.B.1, the concentration of high-density, 
economically depressed communities on the southwest border is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. This mass migration co-occurred with the rise of Mexican drug 
trafficking organization and the shift of the importation zone from the eastern 
United States to the southwestern United States.209 Thus, drug trafficking 
organizations found themselves in control of vast trafficking corridors, enabled by 
Mexican law enforcement and white-collar complicity, and with access to a stable 
 
206. Id. (explaining that “[f ]ar too many courts have ruled that low-level, easily replaceable 
persons do not qualify for a minor role adjustment because they are an ‘indispensable’ part of the 
criminal scheme or played a ‘critical role,’” and noting as an example that “the Sixth Circuit has expressly 
held that ‘[a] defendant whose participation is indispensable to the carrying out of the plan is not entitled 
to a role reduction.’”). 
207. Letter from Theodore Simon, President, National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission, NACDL Comments on 
Proposed Amendments for 2015 Cycle at 6 (March 18, 2015), http://nacdl.org/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=36638&libID=36608. 
208. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at app. C. 
209. See WATT & ZEPEDA, supra note 153, at 159–60. 
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supply of inexpensive labor.210 The laborers suffer the brunt of enforcement efforts 
as frontline fodder in the drug war.211 
Further, the 2015 Amendment makes indispensability arguments even more 
tempting for the unwary. If courts are to evaluate a courier’s role vis-à-vis 
immediately related participants, the concept of indispensability is distorted. The 
courier—usually an unskilled pedestrian or automobile driver—appears far more 
significant when her actions are placed under the judicial microscope. Others 
presumably grew or manufactured the drugs, packaged the drugs, financed the 
operation, and secured safe passage to the border, but without that particular red-
handed courier, the drugs would have rotted in a warehouse in Tijuana or Nogales. 
While labeling a courier “indispensable” may be correct in a purely 
philosophical sense, it frustrates practical sentencing purposes. Evaluating 
indispensability conflates role analysis with causation and permits the most 
attenuated levels of causation.212 Such an evaluation is akin to calling a gas station 
attendant “indispensable” to the problem of global warming. Causation is dealt with 
in every criminal case213 and therefore should not be double-counted against 
relatively low-level defendants at sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the current Guidelines, low-level drug couriers and mules remain at 
extraordinary risk of receiving sentences intended to punish drug kingpins. The 
reforms proposed in this Note would decouple Role Cap and the 
Methamphetamine enhancement from mitigating role, and aim to lessen the impact 
of errors. Amending mitigating role to distinguish it from the aberrant behavior 
departure analysis and disentangle indispensability analyses will promote more just 
and consistent outcomes between federal circuits and among judges within 
jurisdictions. Most importantly, these changes recommended herein will help 
prevent drug couriers and mules—low-level, and often vulnerable, actors within 
larger trafficking schemes—from facing overly harsh penalties. 
Critically, the proposed changes are relatively simple, easy and effective steps. 
While the relationship between the advisory Guidelines and case law remains 
tenuous, these proposals are at the very least a step in the right direction toward the 
goal of correcting the unduly harsh and unpredictable sentencing regime, which 





212. The traditional understanding of but-for causation is that “[c]onduct is the cause of a 
result” if “it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred.” Burrage, 
134 S. Ct. at 887–88 (internal quotations omitted). 
213. “When a crime requires ‘not merely conduct but also a specified result of conduct,’ a 
defendant generally may not be convicted unless his conduct is ‘both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the 
“legal” cause (often called the “proximate cause”) of the result.’” Id. at 887. 
